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Abstract—We analyze the physical layer security of a commu-
nication scheme with a multiple antenna legitimate transmitter,
employing transmit antenna selection (TAS), and a single antenna
legitimate receiver in the presence of a single antenna eaves-
dropper. We developed closed-form expressions for the analysis
of the secrecy outage probability supposing independent and
quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels. Our results show that
the secrecy outage probability is considerably increased when
multiple antennas are available at the legitimate transmitter.
Moreover, due to the use of the TAS technique, the eavesdropper
is not able to exploit the additional spatial diversity offered by
the legitimate transmitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium rises several
security issues, once anyone within the communication range
can overhear the transmission and possibly extract some
information. Cryptographic techniques relying on secret keys
have been widely used to assure confidentiality [1]. However,
those techniques rely on the limited computational power
of the eavesdropper, which however is rising at a very fast
pace. Moreover, complex protocols are needed to assure the
distribution and maintenance of the secret keys.
Physical layer security was pioneered by Shannon [2]. Later,
in [3], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel and proved that
there are channel codes that guarantee both low error proba-
bilities and a certain degree of confidentiality. In the wiretap
channel, two legitimate users, commonly known as Alice
and Bob, communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper,
known as Eve. Alice and Bob communicate through the main
channel while Eve observes through the eavesdropper channel
a degraded version of the message seen by Bob. In [3], [4]
it was demonstrated that the secrecy capacity on a Gaussian
wiretap channel can be defined as the difference between the
capacity of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel,
considering that the capacity of the former is greater than the
later. In [5], [6] the authors have studied the secrecy capacity
and secrecy outage probability when the wiretap channel is a
quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel.
Recently, in [7] secrecy capacity expressions were derived to
the Gaussian Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) wiretap
channel, also known as MIMOME channel, where the Alice,
Bob and Eve are assumed to have multiple antennas. A
different scenario was analyzed in [8] in which only the eaves-
dropper has multiple antennas and the channels are subject to
quasi-static Rayleigh fading. The authors in [8] have shown
that, from a secrecy point of view and when Selection Com-
bining (SC) is taken into account, a single multiple antenna
eavesdropper causes the same effect of multiple single antenna
eavesdroppers. Moreover, it was shown that the secrecy outage
probability rises as the number of the eavesdropper antennas
increases. The authors also compared SC to Maximal Ratio
Combining (MRC) at the eavesdropper. Their results show
that MRC is more efficient than SC, which means that the
eavesdropper may be more dangerous by employing MRC
(would be more successful in extracting information from the
signal sent from Alice to Bob). By its turn, in [9] both Bob
and Eve are assumed to have multiple antennas while Alice
is a single antenna device. The authors developed closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability, considering that
the receivers employ MRC. The results show that the use of
multiple receive antennas can enhance security, and that the
secrecy outage probability is a function of the ratio between
the number of receive antennas at Bob and Eve.
Instead, in this work we assume that only Alice has multiple
antennas and that Bob and Eve are single antenna devices.
For instance, in practice Alice can be seen as a base station
in a cellular network, while Bob and Eve may be regular
mobile users. Therefore, due to size and cost limitations it
is reasonable to assume that they are single antenna devices.
We assume that Alice employs Transmit Antenna Selection
(TAS), and that Bob informs Alice of the best antenna index
through an open (non-secure) and low rate return channel.
Although Eve is able to access the open return channel, it will
not be able to exploit this information since Eve has access
uniquely to the the antenna index, not to anything related to
the information. Moreover, such an antenna index is optimum
for the main channel only. Therefore, Eve is not able to exploit
any additional diversity from the multiple transmit antennas at
Alice. The main contributions of this paper are the closed-form
expressions derived to the secrecy outage probability and to
show that physical layer security can be considerably enhanced
through of the use of TAS at Alice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. In Section III the closed-form
expressions for the analysis of the secrecy outage probability
are derived. Section IV presents secrecy outage probability
numerical results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Fig. 1. System Model. Alice is the Base Station, while the receivers, Bob
and Eve, are regular users of the cellular network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider that Alice has LA antennas and that Bob and
Eve are single antenna devices. For instance Alice could be
the base station of a cellular network, while Bob and Eve are
regular users, as illustrated in Fig. 1. All channels are assumed
to be quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, and all noise
vectors are zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian.
The receivers have full channel state information (CSI) of their
own channels [5]. Moreover, we consider the presence of an
open return channel. Through this channel Bob sends the index
of Alice’s antenna with the best signal to noise ratio (SNR) at
Bob. Then, Alice uses this index in a TAS scheme, allowing
Bob to achieve LA diversity order. From Eve’s point of view,
the optimum TAS scheme for Bob seems to be a random TAS
scheme, as the main channel and the eavesdropper channel
are uncorrelated and Eve have no CSI of the main channel.
Consequently, Eve is not capable of exploiting any additional
spatial diversity, achieving a unitary diversity order.
After TAS Alice sends the message x to Bob. The signal
vector y received by Bob can be written as:
y = hM x+ nM (1)
where hM is a scalar representing the Rayleigh fading coeffi-
cient of the channel between the selected antenna from Alice
and the receive antenna at Bob, while nM is the noise vector.
By its turn, Eve is capable of eavesdropping the signal sent
by Alice. Thus, the signal vector received by Eve is given by:
z = hW x+ nW (2)
where hW is the Rayleigh fading coefficient and nW is the
noise vector.
Now, we can write the instantaneous SNR at Bob’s receiver
as:
γM =
PκM |hM |
2
NM
, (3)
where P is the average transmit power, κM is the path loss
coefficient of the main channel, and NM is the noise power
of the main channel. The average SNR is γM =
PκME[|hM|
2]
NM
where E[.] is the mathematical expectation. Similarly, for Eve
we have γW = PκW |hW|
2
NW
, and γW =
PκWE[|hW|
2]
NW
, where κW
is the path loss coefficient of the eavesdropper’s channel and
NW is the noise power of the eavesdropper’s channel.
The probability density function (pdf) of γM can be written
as [10]:
p(γM) =
LA
γ
M
·exp
(
−
γM
γ
M
)
·
[
1− exp
(
−
γM
γ
M
)]LA−1
, γM > 0
(4)
and the pdf of γW is
p(γW ) =
1
γW
· exp
(
−
γW
γW
)
, γW > 0. (5)
As aforementioned, the instantaneous secrecy capacity can
be defined as:
Cs = CM − CW (6)
where
CM = log (1 + γM ) , (7)
is the instantaneous capacity of the main channel1. Likewise:
CW = log (1 + γW ) . (8)
Thus, based on the non-negativity of the channel capacity, we
can rewrite the secrecy capacity as
Cs =
{
log (1 + γM )− log (1 + γW ) γM > γW
0 γM ≤ γW
(9)
Considering the independence between the main channel
and the eavesdropper’s channel, we can derive the probability
of the existence of a non-zero secrecy capacity as:
P(Cs > 0) = P(γM > γW )
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γM
0
p(γM , γW )dγW dγM
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γM
0
p(γM )p(γW )dγW dγM
= 1−
Γ (1 + LA) Γ
(
γM+γW
γW
)
Γ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
) , (10)
where P(θ) is the probability of the event θ, and p(γM , γW ) =
p(γM )p(γW ) is the joint pdf of γM and γW . Moreover, Γ(.)
denotes the complete Gamma function defined as Γ(s) =∫∞
0 t
s−1e−tdt [11, Chap. 6].
1In this paper log is the logarithm to base two.
P(Cs < Rs | γM > γW ) = P([log (1 + γM )− log (1 + γW )] < Rs | γM > γW ) (14)
= P(γM <
(
2Rs (1 + γW )− 1
)
| γM > γW ) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ (2Rs(1+γW )−1)
γW
p (γM ) p (γW )
P(γM > γW )
dγMdγW
=
−γMΓ (1 + LA) Γ
(
γM
γW
)
+ γWΓ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
)
2F1
(
−LA,
2−RsγM
γW
, 1 + 2
−RsγM
γW
, e
1−2
Rs
γM
)
γWΓ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
)
− γMΓ(1 + LA)Γ
(
γM
γW
)
O(Rs) =
γWΓ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
)
2F1
(
−LA,
2−RsγM
γW
, 1 + 2
−RsγM
γW
, e
1−2
Rs
γM
)
γWΓ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
)
− γMΓ(1 + LA)Γ
(
γM
γW
) + (15)
Γ(1 + LA)
{
γWΓ
(
γM+γW
γW
)
− γMΓ
(
γM
γW
) [
1 + 2F1
(
−LA,
2−RsγM
γW
, 1 + 2
−RsγM
γW
, e
1−2
Rs
γM
)]}
γWΓ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
)
− γMΓ(1 + LA)Γ
(
γM
γW
) .
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
A more adequate metric to measure the performance of a
quasi-static Rayleigh channel is the outage probability, which
can be defined as [5], [6]:
O(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs), (11)
where Rs > 0 is the secrecy rate [5], [9]. We can rewrite the
secrecy outage probability as:
O(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs | γM > γW )P(γM > γW ) +
P(Cs < Rs | γM ≤ γW )P(γM ≤ γW ). (12)
Note that Cs = 0 when γM ≤ γW and Rs > 0, therefore
P(Cs < Rs | γM ≤ γW ) = 1. In (10) we defined P(γM >
γW ), consequently
P(γM ≤ γW ) = 1− P(γM > γW )
=
Γ (1 + LA) Γ
(
γM+γW
γW
)
Γ
(
1 + LA +
γM
γW
) . (13)
Now, knowing that p (γM , γW | γM > γW ) = p(γM )p(γW )P(γM>γW ) ,
we can determine P(Cs < Rs | γM > γW ) as show
in (14). Note that in (14) 2F1(a, b; c; z) is the Gauss hy-
pergeometric function, which is defined as 2F1(a, b; c; z) =∑∞
k=0
(a)k(b)k
(c)k
zk
k! , in which (.)i is the Pochhammer symbol
defined as (x)n = Γ(x+n)Γ(x) [11, Chap. 15]. In addition, all
functions used in this paper can be easily found in modern
mathematical frameworks and in [11].
Finally, taking (10), (13) and (14), and then putting into
(12) we have a closed-form expression for the secrecy outage
probability for our proposed scheme, which is given by (15).
Notice that when LA = 1, (15) reduces to:
O(Rs) = 1−
γM
γM + 2
RsγW
exp
(
−
2Rs − 1
γM
)
, (16)
which is the same result as that in [5], where the authors
considered that Alice, Bob and Eve are single antenna devices
communicating over independent and quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channels.
We end this section by noting that beamforming, which
allows for simultaneous transmissions through all antennas, is
known to outperform the other transmit diversity techniques
as TAS. Nevertheless, beamforming requires complete CSI
feedback from Bob to Alice, which is often not practical as
it would require a very high capacity return channel [12].
Moreover, with beamforming Eve would be still able to take
advantage of the spatial diversity offered by Alice’s transmit
antenna, unless Alice has full CSI of the eavesdropper channel,
which is an even less practical assumption. Our proposed
scheme, besides requiring a very low rate return channel as
only a few bits have to be fed back, also guarantees that
Eve will not be able to exploit the additional spatial diversity
offered by Alice’s antennas.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme by means of some numerical results. Fig. 2 compares
the secrecy outage probability for different values of LA,
γW = 10dB and Rs = 0.1bits/s/Hz. From the figure we
can notice that the secrecy outage probability decreases as
the diversity order increases. For example, for O(Rs) = 10−2
a gain around 6dB in SNR is achieved by having LA = 2
instead of LA = 1. From the figure we can conclude that
the system is able to support tighter security constraints when
multiple antennas are available at the transmitter. Moreover,
it is important to notice that Monte Carlo simulation and
analytical results agree very well, confirming the correctness
of the theoretical analysis.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability for different
γW , assuming LA = 4 and target secrecy rates: Rs =
0.1bits/s/Hz and Rs = 1bits/s/Hz. The outage probability rises
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability as a function of γM when Rs =
0.1bits/s/Hz.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability as a function of γM , for different γW .
The solid lines and the dash lines represent, respectively, Rs = 0.1bps/s/Hz
and Rs = 1bps/s/Hz.
as the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel increases.
However, in the Rayleigh fading scenario it is possible to
achieve a certain level of secrecy outage probability even if
γW > γM , which is not possible with Gaussian channels.
Consequently, a certain degree of confidentiality is achievable
even if the main channel is worse than the eavesdropper
channel.
Similar conclusions can be obtained when the diversity
order LA may vary as show in Fig. 4, in which the secrecy
outage probability is a function of the secrecy rate Rs. We
assume that the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel is
fixed to γW = 0dB and the average SNR of the main channel
can assume values γM = 5dB and γM = 10dB. From Fig. 4
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability as a function of Rs, for different γW ,
γM and LA.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability, as a function of γM . We compare the
performance between the proposed scheme (TAS) and that in [9] (MRC) when
γW = 10dB and Rs = 0.1bits/s/Hz, and where LB and LE are the number
of antennas at Bob and Eve.
we can see that to a given secrecy outage probability it is
possible to achieve gains in the order of 3.5 to 4.5 times in
the secrecy rate by increasing LA or by having a stronger main
channel.
In Fig. 5 we compare the proposed scheme to the one
described in [9], in which the authors consider that Alice
is a single antenna device, and that both Bob and Eve have
multiple antennas and employ the MRC technique. From the
figure, which assumes γW = 10dB and Rs = 0.1bits/s/Hz,
we can see that the proposed scheme outperforms the method
in [9] for all SNR. Note that the advantage is even larger at
low SNR. Other values of secrecy rates were considered and
similar conclusions were obtained. Notice that in the scheme
introduced in [9] both Bob and Eve are able to exploit spatial
diversity. However, in our proposed scheme only Bob is able
to exploit the additional spatial diversity offered by Alice2.
Furthermore, we remark that to all results presented in this
Section no more than two bits are necessary to be transmitted
from Bob to Alice through the return channel. The number of
bits which have to be transmitted through the return channel
is n = ⌈log(LA)⌉.
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the secrecy of a scenario in which Alice
has multiple antennas while Bob and Eve are single antenna
devices. A limited feedback channel is assumed between
Bob and Alice, while Alice employs TAS. We developed
closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability.
Our results show that high levels of security can be achieved
when the number of antennas at Alice increases. Furthermore,
due to the use of TAS at Alice, Eve is not able to exploit
any additional diversity offered by Alice, what is considerably
beneficial in terms of secrecy.
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